A U.S. View of the Product Liability Aspects of Innovation by Frazza, George S.
Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 15 | Issue Article 18
January 1989
A U.S. View of the Product Liability Aspects of
Innovation
George S. Frazza
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
George S. Frazza, A U.S. View of the Product Liability Aspects of Innovation, 15 Can.-U.S. L.J. 85 (1989)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol15/iss/18
A U.S. View of the Product Liability Aspects of Innovation
George S. Frazza*
As Mr. Nomura was talking about the different cultural characteristics
of the Japanese and Americans you may have been wondering
whether the American product liability monster is deeply embedded in
our culture. What makes the U.S. tort system unique? Our product lia-
bility system did not come over on the Mayflower; but rather it was born
about twenty-five years ago.
When I first came to Johnson & Johnson, the lowest lawyer on the
totem pole had two duties: to get beer for the lawyers' picnic and to
handle all the product liability cases. Somebody would come to you with
a small folder. You would look through it and there would be a couple
of "who beat whom to the intersection" cases. I remember one case in-
volving a man who filled a bathtub with baby powder, tried to drown
himself in it, and then sued us for failure to warn how dangerous our
product was. That was about it, product liability was a legal backwater
- and the corporation was, even then, probably the largest health care
company in the world.
The product liability phenomenon is less than twenty-five years old,
and it is, incidentally, a distinctly American phenomenon. For those of
you who are interested in how this genie got out of the bottle, I recom-
mend Peter Uber's book, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Conse-
quences. It is a highly readable account of how we got where we are. I
will not dwell on the reasons for the explosive growth of product liability,
a growth that has come about in an unprincipled and uncoordinated
fashion. It is always fun to bash the lawyers and blame it on them. I
think a part of the problem is that we turn out more lawyers than the
Japanese do engineers.
Let's take a brief look at the U.S. product liability system and what
makes it unique. First, there is the number and size of claims that are
involved. The U.S. tort liability system encompasses all non-contractual
claims for personal and financial injury. It is a very broad spectrum of
claims arising from medical malpractice to football injuries to skiing in
public parks. Automobile claims represent about half of the total, and
they have remained remarkably steady over the last ten to fifteen years.
This is due, in part, to the no-fault laws and the mechanisms that have
been fashioned to resolve these cases. The automobile cases do not pose
a tremendous burden on either the court system or on society in general.
* Vice-President and General Counsel, Johnson & Johnson.
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They are generally settled for amounts within predictable ranges, and
they are not included in my remarks today.
Apart from the auto cases, there has been a dramatic increase in
liability claims relating to products, professionals, municipalities and
non-profit entities. Excluding the asbestos claims, the number of product
liability claims has increased fivefold between 1975 and 1985. The great-
est growth, of course, is in the mass toxic tort area, for example, Agent
Orange and Dalkon Shield.
There are now 325,000 claims involving the Dalkon Shield. There
were 15,000 claims when Robins filed for bankruptcy hoping they could
clean up everything. Robins was ordered to advertise in the newspapers
to notify potential claimants and 325,000 claims miraculously appeared
out of nowhere. That was far beyond anybody's expectations.
In the last decade there has been a dramatic increase in negligence
claims. There has been a threefold increase in malpractice claims, espe-
cially against obstetricians and pediatricians. There has also been a sub-
stantial increase in claims against municipalities. New York City
reported almost a 400% increase in claims between 1979 and 1983.
In 1966, Johnson & Johnson had three or four tort claims other than
auto cases, now we have close to a thousand. Half of our profits and half
of our sales are outside the United States, but I doubt whether we have
more than two dozen claims outside the United States. At last count, we
had settled all but five of the non-U.S. lawsuits, and those are not a sig-
nificant concern to us. In the United States, however, we have seven
lawyers and paralegals in our law department managing the U.S. cases,
along with hundreds of outside lawyers around the country. These peo-
ple manage and coordinate the claims, formulate settlement policies and
try to settle the claims before they go to court. I doubt whether all of our
product liability problems outside the United States take up the time of a
single lawyer.
Aside from the number of claims, the size of the awards in the
United States has increased also. The average jury verdict in malpractice
suits has gone from $200,000 to $1 million during the past ten years. In
the decade between 1975 and 1985 the average product liability verdict
went from about $392,000 to $1.85 million, according to Rand Institute
statistics. It is very difficult to get accurate figures, but no one can deny
that there has been a dramatic increase.
There were three malpractice verdicts in 1975 of $1 million or more.
There were seventy-four in 1985. Most of these awards come at the high
end of the scale. Many cases settle, with inflation taken into considera-
tion, for just about what they settled for ten or fifteen years ago, but one
$15 million or $20 million verdict can skew all the figures. Remember
that most cases are not tried. Most cases are settled, and the settlement
amounts reflect the jury verdicts in the cases that are tried. When you
are about to go to trial on a case in the same jurisdiction two weeks after
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a multimillion dollar verdict has been returned in a similar case, it is like
negotiating a settlement in the shadow of the gallows. You either have to
pay the demand or buckle up and go at it again.
The cost of the system is far greater than anywhere else in the world.
Estimates range between $30 billion and $80 billion. At any rate, the
United States spends more on the tort liability system than on fire and
police departments or state social welfare programs. Whatever the direct
cost, there is an enormous expenditure of public and private resources
independent of the costs incurred in the courts. The great bulk of these
funds are not going to injured plaintiffs, they are going to transaction
costs. The Rand study indicates that sixty-two cents of every dollar in
asbestos cases goes to transaction costs, including attorneys' fees. The
percentages are similar in other mass tort cases. These costs are outland-
ish by any measure. They make Jim and Tammy Bakker look like frugal
administrators, when you look at the rake-off that the system takes
before anything goes to the plaintiff. Of course, these costs are paid by
the consumer in the form of higher prices or in the form of products that
never get to the market.
We have moved from a fault-based system to a strict liability sys-
tem. That means you pay as if you are at fault whether you are actually
at fault or not; you pay if you caused an injury, negligent or not; and
often you pay, absent proof of causation, simply because you have the
money. In many cases, the outcome can be explained only by an unprin-
cipled search for a deep pocket.
The New York courts last week expanded on the Sindell doctrine,
which subjected a manufacturer to liability in a DES case absent proof
that the plaintiff used its drug. Manufacturers are held liable for dam-
ages based on their market share. In other words, if the total recovery
was $100,000, each of five manufacturers paid $20,000 or one fifth of the
total. The New York courts expanded this idea, saying that a claimant
does not even have to prove the product was sold in New York. All that
must be proven is that in the 1960s the product was sold somewhere. If a
manufacturer sold it anywhere in the United States, a New York plaintiff
can recover against the manufacturer. We have come light miles from a
fault-based system.
All of you are familiar with the Bashoda case. Bashoda was the
asbestos case where the court held that even if the dangers of asbestos
were scientifically undiscoverable at the time that the products were pro-
duced, the defendant manufacturers were still liable for the failure to
warn of a risk they didn't know about. That was overturned by the New
Jersey legislature about three years later, but it may have been the high
water mark in product liability.
Also responsible for the expansion of product liability is the erosion
of causation as a prerequisite of liability. In pharmaceutical cases, for
instance, the claimant ostensibly has to prove that the drug caused the
injury, and that the manufacturer negligently failed to warn of the injury,
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knowing the state of the art. Those were the two issues. Today the
search for cause has become much more elusive. We can now detect
innumerable substances that may be linked to cancer, inject high doses
into animals and extrapolate the results of those studies to humans. This
complex, scientific data is brought into the courtroom before a lay jury,
not on the basis of impartial scientific testimony, but on the basis of paid
experts for each side. By impartial, I do not mean scientifically impar-
tial, I mean impartial from the standpoint of not having a stake in the
outcome of the case. Independent scientific testimony which is undistil-
led is rigorously excluded from U.S. courts - your advocate and my
advocate get up there and we have it out. Plaintiffs and defendants play
the same game. When you look at a scientist, you look at his apparent
credentials and then you videotape him to see how well he does before
the jury. That is not the way you would pick your family doctor. If
someone had a very serious disease, you would not ask for the best-
looking pathologist you can find.
That is our system and it has many other characteristics that do not
exist anywhere in the world, such as open-ended damages for pain and
suffering and mental anguish. Consider punitive damages. Punitive
damages originated in England because the sheriff simply could not jail
everyone who got in a Saturday night barroom brawl. Individuals were
given the right to bring a civil action, and the court had the right to
award punitive damages. It was a way of helping the sheriff keep up with
the mayhem. Today, punitive damages are given for the most outlandish
reasons. One particular case against Ortho, the Wooderson case, in-
volved a rare kidney disease. Someone in an obscure medical journal
linked oral contraceptives to the disease. The pharmaceutical companies
asked the FDA to put a warning about the linkage in the physician in-
structions and the FDA said, "Get out of here, you're crazy. It's unsub-
stantiated, the data's flawed." To make a long story short, somebody
sued, claimed they had the disease, and that it had been caused by the
oral contraceptive. Punitive damages were awarded. The jury said,
"You should have tried harder to get the FDA to put the warning on the
drug."
There is another feature of the system that is part of the problem -
joint and several liability. If you are 1% liable, you are responsible for
100% of the damages. That means, if the anesthesiologist is drunk and
he is judgment-proof, if he has no money, and the hospital has no money,
you sue the drug company claiming that the labeling on the anesthetic
was not in big block letters. The lawyer says to the jury, "You should
find these guys 1% liable. Send them a message." The jury does not
know that the 1% means that the person who is not judgment-proof is
responsible for the entire judgment. So the system is inefficient, unprinci-
pled and unpredictable. How can you be deterred from something if you
don't know where lightning is going to strike?
We are here to talk about the effect of product liability on innova-
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tion. Hard data is very difficult to find, but you can use informed judg-
ment, some common sense, some deductive reasoning and some
anecdotes to show that product liability suits have a direct and debilitat-
ing effect on innovation. Defending product liability suits costs an awful
lot, and those funds have to come from somewhere. So if you link pro-
ductivity or allocation of resources with innovation, that means that
those funds spent on lawyers are not being spent on scientists. That
money probably is going to flow somewhere else.
We also know it changes behavior patterns. Oral contraceptives are
a classic example. There is a warning on oral contraceptives that goes to
the doctor. It is just a little shorter than War and Peace. The lawyers
write it, but the doctor never reads it. It is not a medical document, it is
a legal document. The FDA is absolutely enraged, but they go along
with the labeling because lawyers say, "You have to protect the manufac-
turer." I say that the system is not honest with itself and that drug warn-
ings that are scientifically invalid debase the whole health care system.
If a child gets a bump on his head, he is given a CAT scan, not for
medical reasons, but to protect against liability. The American Medical
Association has figures on the number of unnecessary procedures. They
say an incredible percentage of procedures costing millions are done to
protect doctors, not to help patients.
We know that products are priced higher. We know that 30% of
the price of a stepladder or 95% of the price of children's vaccines goes
towards liability protection. We know consumers are paying for it.
There is only one manufacturer of football helmets left in the coun-
try. Recently in New Jersey there was a suit brought against a junior
high school football coach because he told his players to hit harder. Of
course, the suit was thrown out of court, but the New Jersey legislature
had to pass a law protecting little league coaches because the coaches
were just walking out. About a year and a half later Governor Kean
signed a law limiting the liability of high school coaches.
We know the effect of lack of insurance. In the drug industry there
has not been any insurance for years. The American insurance compa-
nies used to write policies and then reinsure them with Lloyds, but
Lloyds has left the table.
As a result, all the large pharmaceutical companies are self-insured.
That is a tremendous burden, but more important for innovation, it bene-
fits the entrenched, because the small biotech company developing and
selling new products on risky and unfamiliar frontiers cannot compete
without insurance.
Contraceptives are a good example of lack of innovation. Johnson
& Johnson is the biggest oral contraceptive manufacturer in the world.
The patents have been out for years and the product has not changed
much. There has been no real research done on different products be-
cause any new product dealing with the reproductive system, despite ap-
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proval by the FDA, has a high element of product liability risk. No one
knows whether a new product would be better than the current product
because no new products have appeared. As a large established com-
pany, we benefit from the status quo. We do very well by this system.
The Dalkon Shield, which deserved to go off the market, also re-
sulted in removal of our IUD from the market. We had fifty or sixty
lawsuits and sales of about $3 million or $4 million. IUDs are not very
profitable, the doctors make most of the money on intrauterine devices.
So the gain was not worth the gamble.
The classic example is Bendectin, a Merrill-Dow drug. There is not
a responsible scientist in the world who believes that there is any hard
data linking Bendectin to birth defects, but a large number of cases were
brought on the basis of some poorly-crafted animal studies. Merrill-Dow
won most of them, but got hit with $75 million in damages, which is on
appeal. The fact is that most pharmaceuticals have a finite amount of
sales potential; you cannot increase morning sickness medication sales,
there are only so many customers. On the other hand, you have an infi-
nite exposure to liability.
Seventy percent of the price which Cessna and Beech charge for
their airplanes goes for insurance. Aerodynamic research used to come
from small plane manufacturers in this country, but this is no longer the
case. Burt Rutan, who flew a sailplane around the world, had begun to
sell kits. He went out of business because he couldn't get any insurance.
Vaccines, of course, are another prominent example. There are only
one or two vaccine manufacturers left in the United States. The Japanese
are taking the research lead away from us. It is appalling that there is so
little interest in research on mass inoculation vaccines in the United
States right now.
I could go on but I don't want to end on a dark note. As Mark
Twain said, "Wagner's music is not as bad as it sounds." Well, product
liability is not as bad as it sounds, because a lot of the problems are
finally being corrected.
Reading the court decisions or criticisms of the system in the lay
press gives us hope that the winds of change are blowing. A recent New
Republic article written by Henry Farley talks about the United States'
morbid fear of risk. We have always prided ourselves on being a country
of diversity, with people from all different backgrounds, races and coun-
tries, but the one thing we had in common was that our ancestors were
all risk-takers. The risks of coming to the United States were enormous,
but our ancestors were all people who took risks. Today, if Columbus
had trouble, I wonder whether he would turn around and go back to sue
the sail manufacturer.
I think the climate is changing, but whether or not there is a com-
petitive difference, there is simply no comparison between the U.S. and
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Canadian product liability systems. This is one area where we should
look north and emulate our good friend and neighbor.
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